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Abstract
This paper provides a structural estimation of the recent model
proposed by Pissarides and Vallanti, a simplied equilibrium model
which draws heavily on models with frictions and quasi-rents. The
structural model is a system of three equations. The estimation method
is a three-stage least squares. My empirical results nd that although
faster TFP growth temporarily decreases employment, most likely be-
cause job destruction reacts faster to schocks than job creation does,
after the rst year I do not nd any statistically signicant e¤ect of
growth on employment.
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1 Introduction
Equilibrium models of employment imply that the impact of Total Factor
Productivity (TFP, hereafter) growth on employment is ambiguous: it could
be positive or negative.1 The conventional matching model with techno-
logical change (Pissarides, 1999 and 2000) shows that the rate of technical
progress inuences equilibrium labour market tightness (measured by number
of vacant jobs ratio/unemployment rate). At higher growth, labour market
tightness is higher, wages and vacancies are both higher and unemployment
lower. This happens because the rm incurs in some hiring costs, in order to
acquire workers who will yield some prot in the future. If the rm knows
that in the steady state hiring costs rise at the same rate as prots, it can
economize on future hiring costs by bringing forward some hiring. So at
higher rates of growth, it goes into the market with more vacancies.
The e¤ect of growth derived above is the capitalization e¤ect. At faster
rate of technological progress all future income ows are discounted at a lower
rate. Because the cost of creating a vacancy is borne now, whereas the prots
from it accrue in the future, the lower discount rate increases job creation.
On the other hand, Schumpeterianmodels of growth (Aghion-Howitt,
1998) go in the opposite direction. In particular, Aghion-Howitt think that
the question about the relationship between growth and unemployment in the
long run is interesting because of the re-allocative aspect of growth. Faster
economic growth must come from a faster increase in knowledge. If the
advancement of knowledge is embodied in industrial innovations it is likely
to raise the job destruction rate, through automation, skill obsolescence, and
the bankruptcy associated with the process of creative destruction. So the
increased growth is likely to produce an increased rate of job-turnover, and
the search theories of Lucas and Prescott (1974) and Pissarides (1999, 2000)
imply that an increased rate of job-turnover will result in a higher natural
1Exceptions are represented by Phelps (1994) and Ball and Mo¢ t (2002). They argue
that the e¤ects of growth on employment are unambigous but temporary.
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rate of unemployment. The analysis of Aghion and Howitt uncovers two
competing e¤ects of growth on unemployment. The rst is the capitalization
e¤ect, whereby an increase in growth raises the rate at which the returns
from creating a rm will grow, and hence increases the capitalized value of
those returns. The capitalization e¤ect encourages more rms to enter.
This raises the number of job openings in the steady state equilibrium, as in
Pissaridesanalysis, thereby reducing the equilibrium rate of unemployment
by increasing the job-nding rate.
The second e¤ect is the creative destruction, according to which an
increase in growth may reduce the duration of a job match, which raises
the equilibrium level of unemployment both directly, by raising the job-
separation rate, and indirectly, by discouraging the creation of job vacancies
and hence reducing the job-nding rate.
The apparent inconsistency between the point of view of Pissarides model
and Schumpeterianmodels is simply resolved by Mortensen and Pissarides
(1998). They show that both types of results can be obtained, depending
on the particular technological assumptions adopted. The capitalization
e¤ect rests on the assumption that technology is disembodied, as in the
Solow model. This means that all existing jobs can take full advantage
of new technological improvements and there is no space for obsolescence.
On the contrary, the creative destruction rests on the Schumpeterian
assumption of embodied technology. This implies irreversibility in the rms
technological choices.
The above results are centered on long-run relationship between economic
growth and employment. Postel-Vinay (2002) shows the short-run behavior
of unemployment in a creative destructioncontext. He supposes the cor-
rectmodel is that of Schumpeterian inspiration and he shows that the
short-run behavior of unemployment in response to a sudden change in the
rate of technological progress is in some sense perverse: it goes in the
opposite direction to its own long-run tendency. In the long-run, faster tech-
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nological change accelerates job obsolescence, while in the short-run it has a
positive and potentially important e¤ects on employment.2
This paper provides a structural estimation of Pissarides and Vallanti
model (2004). This is a simplied equilibrium model which draws heavily on
models with frictions and quasi-rents by Pissarides (1990, 2000), Aghion and
Howitt (1998), Mortensen and Pissarides (1998). The model shows that the
net impact of TFP growth on employment is negative when new technology
is embodied in new jobs but positive when it is disembodied.3
My empirical results nd that although faster TFP growth temporarily
decreases employment, most likely because job destruction reacts faster to
shocks than job creation does, after the rst year I do not nd any statistically
signicant e¤ect of growth on employment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical
model. Section 3 describes the three estimated equations. Section 4 describes
the data. Section 5 presents the results of the econometrics analysis. Section
6 concludes.
2 The Model
Here I provide a complete description of the Pissarides and Vallanti model
(2004). It is a balanced growth model with unknowns the rate of employment,
the rate of unemployment, the capital stock and the wage rate, and exogenous
variables TFP growth, the cost of capital and the labour force (and some
institutional variables).
To derive the growth e¤ects Pissarides and Vallanti assume that job cre-
ation requires some investment on the part of the rm, which may be a set-up
2Postel-Vinay (2002) argues that this nding tends to partially reconcile the Schum-
peterianview of the e¤ects of technological progress on labour markets whith facts such
as the impact of productivity slowdown on unemployment rates in the OECD countries in
the 1970s.
3With embodied technology, Pissarides-Vallanti (2004) mean embodied in new jobs,
not only in new capital.
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cost or a hiring cost. Growth inuences job creation through capitalization
e¤ects and job destruction through obsolescence. The precise inuence on
each depends on whether new technology can be introduced into ongoing job
relationships, or whether it needs to be embodied in new job creation. Both
types of results can be obtained, depending on the particular technological
assumptions adopted. Following Mortensen and Pissarides (1998), Pissarides
and Vallanti assume that there are two types of technology. One, denoted
by A1,can be applied in existing jobs as well as new ones: this is the disem-
bodied technological progress, as in Solow model, and existing jobs can take
full advantage of new technological improvements. The other, denoted by
A2, can only be applied in new jobs: this is the Schumpeterianassumption
of embodied technology. Let the rate of growth of A1be a and the rate of
growth of A2 be (1   )a, with 0    1,so the total rate of growth of
technology is a. The parameter  measures the extent to which technology
is disembodied. If  = 0, this implies the extreme Schumpeterianassump-
tion of embodied technology and if  = 1 we have the Solow disembodied
case. The parameter a is the rate of growth of TFP in the steady state and
is observable while the parameter  is unobservable by the econometrician,
but Pissarides and Vallanti calculate an approximate value for it from the
empirical estimates of their model.
The production function in the model is represented by a Cobb-Douglas;
the output per worker is denoted by f(:; :). The rst argument denotes the
creation time of the job and the second the valuation time. At time  , output
per worker in new jobs is
f( ; ) = A1()
1 A2()1 k( ; ) (1)
where k( ; ) is the capital-labour ratio in new jobs at  . But in jobs of
vintage  output per worker at time t >  is
f( ; t) = A1(t)
1 A2()1 k( ; t) (2)
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where in general k( ; t) is di¤erent from k(t; t).
The value of a job created at time 0 and lasting until T satises the
following Bellman equation, for t 2 [0; T ]:
r(V (0; t) + k(0; t)) = f(0; t)  k(0; t)  w(0; t) (3)
 sV (0; t) + V (0; t)
V (0; T ) = 0
As we can see from the equation above, the value of a job consists of
two parts: the value of its capital stock and a value V (:; :) > 0, which is
due to the frictions and the quasi-rents that characterize employment. The
job can be destroyed either by an exogenous process, which occurs at rate s,
or because of obsolescence, which occurs T periods after creation. Capital
depreciates at rate  and there is a perfect market for capital, in which the
rm can re-sell its capital stock when the job is destroyed. There are no
capital adjustment costs; r is the exogenous rental rate of capital and w(0; t)
is the wage rate at t in a job of vintage 0.
The interpretation of the Bellman equation derives from search theory:
rm hires capital stock k(0; t) and makes prot V (0; t). The rms controls
at time 0 are whether or not to create a job; and once it has been created,
when to terminate it, and the path of k(0; t) for t 2 [0; T ]. It is assumed
that the wage rate is jointly determined by the rm and the worker after a
bargain.
2.1 Capital accumulation
Maximizing the Bellman equation above with respect to k(0; t) we obtain:
k(0; t) = A1(t)A2(0)(=(r + ))
1
1  (4)
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t 2 [0; T ]. The path of capital-labor ratio in existing and new jobs is:
k(0; t) = eatk(0; 0) (5)
k(t; t) = eatk(0; 0) (6)
New jobs are technologically more advanced and have more capital than
old jobs. The labours marginal product is derived from (2) and (4):
( ; t)  f( ; t)  (r + )k( ; t) (7)
When technology on the frontier grows at rate a, output, the capital stock
and labours marginal product in existing jobs grow at a lower rate a:
(0; t) = eat(0; 0); (8)
(t; t) = eat(0; 0): (9)
2.2 Wages
Wages play a key role in the transmission of the e¤ects of growth on employ-
ment. Because of competition from new jobs, wages in existing jobs grow at
a faster rate than the marginal productivity of labour, and so eventually jobs
become unprotable.
The equation for wage is derived by a Nash Bargaining solution:
w( ; t) = (1  )b(t) + m()V (t; t) + ( ; t) (10)
where b(t) is the unemployment income, which grows at rate a by as-
sumption,  > 0 is a measure of market tightness, m() is the rate at which
new job o¤ers arrive to unemployed workers, and  2 [0; 1) is the share of
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labour. There is no search on the job.
The reservation wage is dened as:
!(t)  b(t) + 
1  m()V (t; t): (11)
From (3), (10) and (11) follows that both V (t; t) and w(t; t) grow at rate
a.
The reservation wage captures the external inuences on wages, resulting
from the attractions of quitting to search for alternative jobs. Therefore, we
can write the wage equation as the sum of two components, an insideone
that grows at rate a and depends on the marginal product of labour inside
the rm and the share of the worker , and an outsideone represented by
the reservation wage, which grows at a rate a. For a job created at time 0
the wage equation is:
w(0; t) = (1  )!(0)eat + (0; 0)eat: (12)
2.3 Job creation and job destruction
The present discounted value of prot from a job of vintage 0 is derived
integrating (3):
V (0; 0) =
Z T
0
e (r+s)t((0; t)  w(0; t))dt: (13)
Using (8) and (12) we can re-write (13) as:
V (0; 0) = (1  )
Z T
0
e (r+s)t(eat(0; 0)  eat!(0))dt: (14)
V (0; 0), (0; 0) and !(0) are all proportional to the level of aggregate
technology, A1(0)A2(0); because of that we can simplify 14 omitting the
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time notation:
V = (1  )
Z T
0
e (r+s)t(eat  eat!)dt: (15)
We now di¤erentiate (15) with respect to T to get the obsolescence date
chosen by the rm to maximize the jobs value:
T =
ln  ln!
(1  )a (16)
It follows from (16) that if all technology is of the Solow disembodied type,
 = 1, the rm will never want to destroy a job through obsolescence: job
destruction in this case takes place only because of the exogenous separation
process. But if  < 1 faster growth leads to more job destruction:
@T
@a
< 0:
We derive the equilibrium e¤ect of growth by integrating (15):
V = (1  )

1  e (r+s a)T
r + s  a  
1  e (r+s a)T
r + s  a !

: (17)
The (17) can be re-written as:
V = (1  )(y(a)  y(a)!); (18)
where y(a)  1 e (r+s a)T
r+s a ;  2 [0; 1].
By di¤erentiation,
y0(a) > 0; y00(a) < 0 (19)
To derive the inuence of the growth rate on job creation the model
assumes that jobs are created at some cost, and that the cost increases in the
number of jobs created at any moment in time. To justify this assumption,
the model follows the search and matching literature, which assumes that
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at the level of the rm the cost of creating one more job is constant but
marginal costs are increasing at the aggregate level because of congestion
e¤ects (see Pissarides, 2000). Let  be the ratio of the total number of
advertised vacant jobs to the number of unemployed workers. Then given
the rate of arrival of jobs to workers, m(), the rate of arrival of workers
to jobs is m()=. Consistency requires that this rate decrease in : to be
satised the elasticity of m() (denoted by ) must be a number between
zero and one.
The cost of creating one more job in period t is a ow cost A1(t)A2(t)c
for the duration of the rms search for a suitable worker.4
The present value of creating one more vacant job V 0(t) satises the
Bellman equation:
rV 0(t) =  A1(t)A2(t)c+ m()

(V (t; t)  V 0(t)) + V 0(t): (20)
Under free entry search, V 0(t) = V 0(t) = 0, and so each new job yields
positive prot. In period t = 0 the job creation condition is:
V (0; 0) = A1(0)A2(0)
c
m()
; (21)
or equivalently,
V =
c
m()
: (22)
Substituting V from (18) into (22) gives:
(1  )(y(a)  y(a)!) = c
m()
: (23)
Job creation at time t in this economy is given by x(t) = ~u(t)m(), where
~u(t) is the predetermined number of unemployed workers and m() is the
matching rate for each worker.
4The cost should be increasing at rate a for the existence of a steady state.
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We now obtain the e¤ect of TFP growth on job creation by di¤erentiation
of (23) with respect to a:
cy(a)
1   +
c(1  )
m()

@
@a
= (1  )(y0(a)  y0(a)!): (24)
The coe¢ cient on @
@a
is positive but the right-hand side can be either
positive or negative. By (19), if technology is embodied ( = 0) the sign is
negative; but if technology is disembodied ( = 1) the sign is positive. If
we further di¤erentiate the right-hand side of (24) with respect to , we nd
that it is monotonically rising in . Therefore, there is a unique  () such
that at value of  <  faster growth reduces market tightness and at values
of  >  it increases it. At  =  growth has no e¤ect on .
2.4 Economys steady state
Steady state equilibrium is dened by a path for the average capital-labour
ratio, for the wage rate and for employment rate. The exogenous variables
are TFP, population and real capital cost. Figure (1) shows the aggrega-
tion of the representative rms equilibrium conditions to derive the econ-
omys steady-state paths. Because of the Cobb-Douglas assumption, the
path shown for (:; :) in Figure (1) is a displacement of the path of the cap-
ital stock and the one for output per worker, for each job. In steady state
a job is created in period 0, it is destroyed in period T when a new one is
created, which is destroyed and another one created in its place in period 2T
and so on. The capital stock, output and labours marginal product grow on
average at rate a (see the broken line in Figure 1). If new jobs in the economy
are created continually with the same frequency, the aggregate capital stock,
output and marginal product will grow smoothly at rate a. The average wage
rate also grows at rate a, because of the two components, (:; :) and !(:),
which grow at rate a.
Employment in the representative rm evolves on average according to
11
0 T time
Expected
Returns,
Log scale
Technology
frontier
f(.,t)
w(t)
Figure 1: Expected returns
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the di¤erence between job creation and job destruction:
L(t) = x(t)  e sTx(t  T )  sL(t) (25)
where x(t) is job creation, and exp( sT ) is the fraction of jobs of vintage
t   T that survive to T . In the steady state L(t) is equal to the rate of
change of the population of working age, which is assumed to be exogenous
and equal to n. x(t) is given by ~u(t)m() and so it grows at n, because the
number of unemployed workers ~u(t) grows at n, whereas  and T are the
solutions to (16) and (23).
3 Empirical Analysis
I estimate the structural equations for the capital stock, wages and em-
ployment to derive the e¤ects of TFP growth on employment. Lags of the
dependent variables and TFP are included in order to pick up any short-run
dynamics. The structural model is a system of three equations, which contain
endogenous variables among the explanatory variables. Furthermore, these
endogenous variables are the dependent variables of other equations in the
system. The disturbance are correlated with the endogenous variables and
the error terms among the equations are expected to be correlated. So, to
overcome these issues, I estimate the model by the three-stage least squares
process, including xed e¤ects for each region and time dummies.5
5Three-stage least squares estimation is a three-step process. Step 1 develops instru-
mented values for all endogenous variables. These values can be considered as the pre-
dicted values resulting from a regression of each endogenous variables on all exogenous
variables in the system. Step 2 produces a consistent estimate for the covariance ma-
trix of the equation disturbances. Finally, step 3 performs a GLS-type estimation using
the covariance matrix estimated in the second step and the instrumented values for all
endogenous variables, obtained in step 1.
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3.1 The employment equation
The structural employment equation is represented by (25). Because of the
absence of long time series for job creation and job destruction, only a single
employment equation can be estimated. As a consequence, job creation and
job destruction depend on the same variables because of the impossibility to
identify them separately from a single employment equation. These variables
are the level of marginal product (proxied by the level of TFP and the level
of capital-labour ratio), the wage rate, the interest rate and the expected
rates of growth of marginal product and the wage rate (both proxied by the
rate of TFP growth).
In the estimated employment equation the dependent variable is the ratio
of employment to population of working age and the independent variables
the level and the rate of change of TFP, the level of the capital-labor ratio,
the real cost of labor and the real interest rate. The capital stock and the real
wage are treated as endogenous. The job creation and the job destruction
are characterized by di¤erent adjustment lags and this implies di¤erential
short-run and long-run e¤ects. TFP growth increases job destruction but
may increase or decrease job creation. So the impact of productivity growth
on employment may be negative, and either remain negative or turn positive
in the medium to long-run, if job destruction reacts faster than job creation
to shocks, as found in the data.
3.2 The wage equation
The structural wage equation is represented by (10). The estimated wage
equation is an error-correction equation in wage growth. The ratio of com-
pensation to mean wages and the duration of entitlement represent the un-
employment income b(t), while the parameter  (which stands for the share
of labour in the wage bargain) is represented by the union density. The
marginal product of labor and the expected returns from search are repre-
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sented by the level and the rate of growth of the capital-labour ratio and
TFP. Dividing the capital stock by employment may not give reliable results
because of the possibility of spurious correlation due to cyclical noise in the
employment series. I could deal with this problem by replacing employment
by the labor force. But this was not possible because of not availability of
labor force data at regional level.
3.3 The investment equation
Because of cyclicality problems of employment, as in the wage equation, esti-
mating an investment equation by dividing the capital stock by employment
does not give reliable results. I deal with this problem by estimating an error-
correction equation for the capital stock and replacing employment by the
real wage. The structural investment equation is derived by (4). The capital
stock is proportional to TFP and the factor of proportionality depends on
the cost of capital and the cost of labor. The cost of capital is represented
by the real interest rate.
4 Data
The data come mainly from Cambridge Econometrics database with some ad-
justments. Some variables (at national level ) are from the OECD database,
various issues. Data are annual from 1981-1995 for a sample of European Re-
gions.6 The institutional variables (union density, benet replacement ratio,
benet duration, employment protection and labor taxes) are from Nickell
et al. (2001) and they are at national level.
6The list of the Regions in the sample are in appendix. Tey are from the following
European Countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom. Greek regions and Luxembourg are excluded from
the original sample because some of the institutional variables are missing.
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The calculation of the capital stock is made according to the Perpetual
Inventory Method:
Kt = (1  )Kt 1 + It 1 (26)
where  is the depreciation rate: it is assumed constant and equal to
8%, which is consistent with OECD estimates; I is the gross xed capital
formation.7 The initial value of K is calculate as:
K0 =
I0
g + 
(27)
where g is the average annual logarithmic growth of investment expen-
diture and I0 is investment expenditure in the rst year for which data on
investment are available.
The Total Factor Productivity is calculated by estimating a production
function with country xed e¤ects and time dummies for each year. 8The
aggregate production function is a Cobb-Douglas with the TFP picking up
both types of TFP of the theoretical model: Ait = A1itA2it:
Yit = AitK

itL

it (28)
The cost of capital is represented by the real long term interest rate,
r, calculated deating the long term nominal interest rate by the 3-year
expected ination rate:
r = i  E(d ln p+1) (29)
E(d ln p+1) are tted values from the regression:
d ln p = 1d ln p 1 + 2d ln p 2 + 3d ln p 3 +  (30)
7See Machin and Van Reenen, (1998)
8The estimation method is a feasible xed e¤ect GLS, constructed assuming by country
groupwise heteroskedasticity and a panel-specic (AR1) in the disturbances "it.
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where d ln p is the ination rate (OECD Economic Outlook). The coef-
cients on the right side are restricted to some to one, indicating ination
neutrality in the long-run.9
5 Results
The results of the estimation are reported in tables (1), (2) and (3). I compare
my results with that one found by Pissarides-Vallanti (2004). They have
estimated the model for a sample of 13 European countries, United States
and Japan over the period 1965-1995.
Time dummies are introduced in all the three equations to remove the
common trends and cycles in the regions of the sample and they avoid spu-
rious correlations due to these comovements. The dependent variable in the
employment equation is the employment rate, calculated as the ratio of em-
ployment to population of working age. The independent variables are the
level and the rate of change of TFP, the level of the capital-labor ratio, the
real cost of labor and the real interest rate. I nd a signicative negative
inuence of the rate of growth of TFP on employment in the rst year, but
from the second year this inuence disappears (the coe¢ cient of TFP growth
is positive and insignicant).
The wage equation is an error-correction equation.10 The capital stock
inuences the wage rate with positive coe¢ cient, in both levels and rate of
change, while TFP growth has a negative e¤ect on wage. Institutional vari-
ables give an idea of their impact on wages. In the empirical specication of
the wage equation I introduce the variable employment protection laws, un-
like Pissarides and Vallanti (2004). Employment protection laws may reduce
the e¢ ciency of job matching because may tend to make rms more cautious
9See Cristini (1999).
10The error-correction (ECM) approach overcomes problem of common trends and thus
spurious regression, due of potential non-stationarity of a dynamic model. Furthermore,
the ECM incorporates both short-run and long-run e¤ects.
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Table 1: The employment equation
Dependent variable: ln(L/WP)it
Independent variables
ln(L/WP)it 1 0:890
(31:46)
ln(L/WP)it 2  0:074
( 2:80)
lnwit 1  0:001
( 0:16)
ln(K/WP)*it  0:022
( 1:34)
lnAit  0:037
( 1:40)
dlnAit  0:276
( 7:89)
dlnAit 1 0:034
(1:04)
rit 0:000
(0:18)
Year dummies (15 years) yes
Region dummies (101 regions) yes
Obs 1515
R2 0:98
The estimation method is a three stage least squares.
Numbers in brackets are t-statistics. (L/WP)it is the ratio
of employment to population of working age, in region i
in year t, (K/WP) is the ratio of the capital stock to the
population of working age, A is measured TFP progress,
w is the real wage rate and r is the real interest rate.
*Instrumented variables: the instruments used
are all the exogenous variables in the three
regressions and lags of the endogenous.
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about lling vacancies.11 Furthermore, employment protection may have a
direct impact on wages because it can encourage employees to demand higher
wages, since it raises the job security. However, my results do not show any
e¤ect of employment protection in increasing real wages.
I nd that benet duration has no e¤ect on wages and this result is con-
sistent with that one found by Nickell et al. (2000) for OECD countries. I
do not nd any signicant e¤ect of benet replacement ratio and that taxes
increases wage costs. My results are consistent with those ones found by
Pissarides and Vallanti (2004). On the contrary, Nickell et al.(2000) nd a
direct impact on wages of benet replacement ratio. Looking at the impact
of union density on wages, I nd that it increases wage costs as expected.
Generally, greater union power and coverage can be expected to exert up-
ward pressure on wages. Unfortunately, because of non availability of series
on unemployment rates at regional level, I cannot control for the impact
of unemployment on wages. Pissarides and Vallanti (2004) nd that unem-
ployment has a restraining inuence on wages, as predicted by their model,
but its inuence is reduced in countries that have long durations of benet
entitlement.
The capital equation is also an error-correction equation. Long adjust-
ment lags are included to pick-up any short-run dynamics. I nd no inuence
of interest rate on private investment. TFP has a positive impact on invest-
ment in level, while in the rate of growth the e¤ect is negative in the rst
year but turn positive in the second. As claimed the theoretical model TFP
and its growth rate drive capital accumulation.
Summarizing, my results show that faster TFP growth temporarily de-
creases employment, but there is no e¤ect after the rst year. This kind
of results is most likely due to the fact that job destruction reacts faster
11However, this mechanism is not clear-cut. The introduction of employment laws can
lead to an increased professionalisation of the personnel function within rms. This hap-
pened in Britain in the 1970s (Daniel and Stilgoe, 1978).
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Table 2: The wage equation
Dependent variable: dlnwit
Independent variables
dlnwit 1 0:228
(8:47)
dln(K/L)*it 1:055
(3:77)
dlnAit  0:215
( 2:05)
lnwit 1  0:343
( 14:87)
ln(K/L)it 1 0:053
(0:84)
lnAit 1  0:052
( 0:71)
BD 0:118
(1:03)
unionit 0:008
(3:82)
rerit  0:119
( 1:53)
epit 0:057
(0:66)
d2 ln pit  0:003
( 1:52)
dtax  0:003
( 1:56)
Years dummies (15 years) yes
Region dummies (101 regions) yes
Obs 1515
R2 0:40
See notes on table (1). All variable have been dened except:
BD the maximum duration benet entitlement,
union the fraction of workers belonging to a union (union density),
rer the benet replacement ratio, ep the employment protection, dtax rst
di¤erence of tax wedge, d2 ln pit the rst di¤erence in the ination rate.
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Table 3: The investment equation
Dependent variable: dlnKit
Independent variables
dlnKit 1 0:896
(40:53)
dlnKit 2  0:217
( 12:50)
rit  0:000
( 0:44)
lnw*it 0:004
(5:05)
lnAit 0:030
(9:08)
dlnAit  0:050
( 11:49)
dlnAit 1 0:079
(18:43)
ln(K/WP)it 1  0:017
( 11:13)
Years dummies (15 years) yes
Region dummies (101 regions) yes
Obs 1515
R2 0:96
See notes to table (1)
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to shocks than job creation does, as usually found in the data.12 On the
contrary, Pissarides and Vallanti found that the e¤ects of TFP growth on
employment is statistically signicant and positive, after an initial period of
not more than one year. The implication of their results is that all new tech-
nology is disembodied and creative destructionplays no role in the steady
state employment dynamics of the sample considered, implying a high value
for .
My results show that a faster technological change has a negative impor-
tant short-run inuence on the level of employment and this is consistent
with Pissarides and Vallanti (2004) results, but I was not able to nd any
long-run compensating e¤ect, unlike them. A possible explanation for this
di¤erent result may be represented by the di¤erent level of territorial disag-
gregation considered: national in Pissarides and Vallanti (2004), and regional
in my exercise. If the boundary of rms hiring decisions goes beyond local
or regional context, while the negative shocks of job destruction have a local
impact, the latter may be more evident than the former.
A nal exercise that I make is to consider TFP as endogenous. I instru-
ment it using all the exogenous variables and lags of TFP level and TFP
growth Results do not show any sensible di¤erence with respect to the case
in which TFP is exogenous.13
6 Conclusions
Equilibrium models of employment imply that the e¤ects of faster TFP
growth can be either positive or negative and depend on the extent to which
new technology is embodied in new jobs.
12See Davies, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996). However Boeri (1996) nds that in some
European countries job creation sometimes reacts faster than job destruction because of
ring restrictions but I do not nd this kind of results in my estimates.
13Results are available upon request.
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In this paper I have evaluated the relation between TFP growth and
aggregate employment following the suggestions for the estimation of a model
for employment, wages and investment proposed by Pissarides and Vallanti
(2004). This model draws heavily on model with frictions and quasi-rents
by Pissarides (2000), Aghion and Howitt (1998), Mortensen and Pissarides
(1998) and others.
I have estimated the model for a sample of 101 European Regions over the
period 1981-1995. I have excluded Greek regions and Luxembourg because
some institutional variable were missing.
This paper has showed that faster TFP growth temporarily decreases
employment but there is no e¤ect after the rst year. This kind of results is
most likely due to the fact that job destruction reacts faster to shocks than
job creation does, as usually found in the data. My results are di¤erent from
that ones found by Pissarides and Vallanti (2004). In fact, they have found
a signicative inuence from the rate of growth of TFP on employment,
which are negative in the rst year but turns positive in the second. On
the contrary, my results have showed a negative and important short-run
inuence of faster technological change on the employment rate but I was not
able to any long-run e¤ect, implying that job creationplays no part in the
employment dynamics of the regions in my sample. This may partially due
to the fact that the time period analyzed is shorter (15 years) than that one
used by Pissarides and Vallanti (2004). Moreover, this di¤erent result may be
also represented by the di¤erent level of territorial disaggregation considered:
national in Pissarides and Vallanti (2004), and regional in my exercise. If the
boundary of rms hiring decisions goes beyond local or regional context,
while the negative shocks of job destruction have a local impact, the latter
may be more evident than the former. Also, assuming a more naive wage
equation than the Nash sharing rule may increase the impact of growth on
employment, as pointed out by Pissarides and Vallanti (2004). Finally, the
nding of no long-run e¤ect of growth on employment in my results could
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mean that there are additional forces, beyond the capitalization e¤ect and the
creative destruction e¤ect, which contribute to the relation between growth
and employment.
Phelps (1994), Hoon and Phelps (1997) and Ball and Mo¢ tt (2002) have
identied labour supply forces which imply long lags in the e¤ect of growth
on employment. Ball and Mo¢ tt (2002) claim that because of misperceiving
of the change of TFP growth by workers, it takes many years to adjust
perceptions of future wage growth.
In any case, more work is needed, both theoretical and empirical, to
investigate the impact of growth on employment and to link the demand-
side factors to the supply-side factors.
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A Data denitions and source
Data are mainly from Cambridge Econometrics, a validated database of eco-
nomic indicators for cities and regions. The database draws on the available
o¢ cial data at European and national levels and has undergone a substantial
process of updating and quality checks to improve its consistency, timeliness
and coverage. The current database includes output, employment, house-
hold expenditure, investment expenditure, demographic indicators (total and
working population).
The regions in the sample are presented in tables (4), (5).
Y Gross Value Added in constant prices (base year 1995)
L Total Employment (source: Cambridge Econometrics)
P Working Population (source: Cambridge Econometrics)
w Real labor cost: it is computed from the compensation of employees
data using 1995 as base year (source: Cambridge Econometrics)
K Real capital stock. The calculation of the capital stock is made accord-
ing to the Perpetual Inventory Method. Data on investment expenditure are
from Cambridge Econometrics
A Total Factor Productivity (TFP). It is obtained by estimating a pro-
duction function over the period 1976-2000 from the original sample including
greek regions and luxembourg. The estimation method is a feasible xed ef-
fect GLS estimator, with a variance and covariance matrix that incorporates
heteroskedasticity across countries.
r Real long term interest rate deated by the 3-year expected ination
rate: r = i   E(dlnp+1), where i is the long term nominal interest rate
(source: OECD Economic Outlook, various issues). E(dlnp+1) are tted
values from the regression: d ln p = 1d ln p 1 + 2d ln p 2 + 3d ln p 3 + ,
where d ln p is the ination rate based on the consumer price index p, base
year 1990 (source: OECD Economic Outlook, various issues)
union Net union density is constructed as the ratio of total reported union
members (less retired and unemployed members) (source: Nickell et al. 2001)
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tax Tax wedge consists of the payroll tax rate plus the income tax rate
plus the consumption tax rate (source: Nickell et al. 2001)
rer Benet entitlement before tax as a percentage of previous earnings
before tax. Data are averages over replacement rates at two earnings levels
and three family types (single, with dependent spouse, with spouse at work).
They refer to the rst year of unemployment (source: Nickell et al. 2001,
constructed from OECD data sources)
BD Benet duration dened as a weighted average of benets received
during the second, third, fourth and fth year of unemployment divided by
the benets in the rst year of unemployment (source: Nickell et al. 2001,
constructed from OECD data sources)
p Consumer price index
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Table 4: Sample I
Regions
Bruxelles-Brussel (Be) Extremadura (Es)
Vlaams Gewest (Be) Cataluna (Es)
Region Walonne (Be) Com. Valenciana (Es)
Denmark Baleares (Es)
Baden-Wurttemberg (De) Andalucia (Es)
Bayern (De) Murcia (Es)
Berlin (De) Ceuta y Melilla (Es)
Bremen (De) Canarias (Es)
Hamburg (De) Ile de France (Fr)
Hessen (De) Champagne-Ard (Fr)
Niedersachsen (De) Picardie (Fr)
Nordrhein-Westfalen (De) Haute-Normandie (Fr)
Rheinland-Pfalz (De) Centre (Fr)
Saarland (De) Basse-Normandie (Fr)
Schleswig-Holstein (De) Bourgogne (Fr)
Galicia (Es) Nord-Pas de Calais (Fr)
Asturias (Es) Lorraine (Fr)
Cantabria (Es) Alsace (Fr)
Pais Vasco (Es Franche-Comte (Fr)
Navarra (Es) Pays de la Loire (Fr)
Rioja (Es) Bretagne (Fr)
Aragon (Es) Poitou-Charentes (Fr)
Madrid (Es) Aquitaine (Fr)
Castilla-Leon (Es) Midi-Pyrenees (Fr)
Castilla-la Mancha (Es) Limousin (Fr)
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Table 5: Sample II
Regions
Rhone-Alpes (Fr) Sardegna (It)
Auvergne (Fr) Noord-Nederland (Nl)
Languedoc-Rouss. (Fr) Oost-Nederland (Nl)
Prov-Alpes-Cote dAzur (Fr) West-Nederland (Nl)
Corse (Fr) Zuid-Nederland (Nl)
Ireland Burgenland (At)
Piemonte (It) Niederosterreich (At)
Valle dAosta (It) Wien (At)
Liguria (It) Karnten (At)
Lombardia (It) Steiermark (At)
Trentino-Alto Adige (It) Oberosterreich (At)
Veneto (It) Salzburg (At)
Fr.-Venezia Giulia (It) Tirol (At)
Emilia-Romagna (It) Vorarlberg (At)
Toscana (It) North East (GB)
Umbria (It) North West (GB)
Marche (It) Yorkshire and the Humb (GB)
Lazio (It) East Midlands (GB)
Abruzzo (It) West Midlands (GB)
Molise (It) Eastern (GB)
Campania (It) London (GB)
Puglia (It) South East (GB)
Basilicata (It) South West (GB)
Calabria (It) Wales (GB)
Sicilia (It) Scotland (GB)
Northern Ireland (GB)
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